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The Federal Tax Treatment of Disclaimers of
Future Interests: A Call for Reform
Trent S. Kiziah*
Federal tax laws essentially preclude individuals with a future interest
from disclaiming because the time in which a qualified disclaimer can be
executed may pass before the person becomes aware of the interest and
long before the interest becomes possessory and fixed as to quality and
quantity. This article examines the state of the law prior to enactment of
these limiting tax provisions, examines the call for reform by commentators, and examines the legislative history resulting in the current law. The
author asserts Congress made an informed decision albeit a poor one.
The author recommends Congress revisit the issue and enact legislation to
permit an individual to disclaim within a reasonable period of time after
the later of occur of (1) becoming aware of the future interest or (2) the
future interest becoming indefeasibly fixed.
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INTRODUCTION1
For over two hundred years, the law has permitted individuals to
disclaim a gift or devise.2 As aptly stated by a court in 1819: “[t]he law
1 This article focuses on a narrow issue involving disclaimers. For a general
understanding of disclaimers see the following: (1) 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H.
PARKER, REVISED TREATISE PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS ch. 49 (1962); (2) William P.
LaPiana, Some Property Law Issues in the Law of Disclaimers, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 207 (2003); (3) RONALD A. BRAND & WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N, DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE PLANNING: A GUIDE TO THEIR EFFECTIVE USE (1990);
(4) C.P. Jhong, Annotation, What Constitutes or Establishes Beneficiary’s Acceptance or
Renunciation of Devise or Bequest, 93 A.L.R.2d 8 (1964); (5) L.S. Groff, Annotation,
Beneficiary’s Right to Disclaim or Renounce Spendthrift Trust Prior to Acceptance, 14
A.L.R.3d 1437 (1967); and (6) R.E.H., Annotation, Right to Accept One Devise or
Bequest Under Will and Renounce Another, 91 A.L.R. 607 (1934).
2 See Townson v. Tickell, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 575 (K.B.); 3 B. & ALD. 31 (Abbot,
C.J.). A disclaimer is also referred to as a “renunciation” in the literature. See id.
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is certainly not so absurd as to force a man to take an estate against his
will.”3 Unfortunately, while individuals may disclaim under governing
state law, federal tax law requires an individual to accept or reject gifts
and devises years, often decades, before the person receives the expected inheritance.4 Unless the recipient is a minor, disclaimers must be
made within nine months of a trust’s creation even though the individual
may have no current right to enjoy the income and principal of the trust,
even though the individual may never receive any benefit from the trust
and even though the person may be unaware of the existence of the
inheritance.5 This article examines the historical framework, which finally resulted in Congress enacting legislation, which economically precludes many taxpayers from disclaiming.6 I conclude that Congress
considered various alternatives and intentionally adopted the requirement that individuals must disclaim within nine months of the creation
of the interest. While I believe Congress made an informed decision, I
argue that the nine-month period should run from the time that the person is presented with a current possessory interest. I recommend that
Congress revisit the issue and enact legislation to permit individuals
nine months in which to disclaim after the interest becomes possessory
before facing tax consequences.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Common and Statutory State Disclaimer Laws Pre – TRA ’76
For over two hundred years, the law has clearly recognized the right
of an individual to disclaim a gift or devise.7 Disclaimers are based on
the concept that a person cannot be forced to accept property he or she
doesn’t want.8 Generally, a donee must accept a gift before it is complete.9 Likewise, a devisee must accept or be deemed to have accepted
3

Id. at 576-77.
See I.R.C. §2518(b)(2).
5 Id. §2518(b)(2)(B).
6 While the taxpayer may be able to disclaim under the governing state law, the
disclaimer will not be recognized as a “qualified disclaimer” under I.R.C. §2518. The
taxpayer will be deemed to have made a taxable gift even though under state law they
have disclaimed the property. The taxpayer will thus have a tax cost without the inherited property to pay the gift tax. The tax cost makes it costly, and in many cases, prohibits
the taxpayer from disclaiming.
7 John H. Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 316, 316 & nn. 1-2 (1979).
8 Id. at 318; See also Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 323 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Joan B. Ellsworth, On Disclaimers: Let’s Renounce I.R.C. Section 2518, 38
VILL. L. REV. 693, 694 (1993).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.1 (1992); see also
Jewett, 455 U.S. at 323; Ellsworth, supra note 8, at 694.
4
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a devise in order for the devise to be effectuated.10 This freedom to
disclaim did not apply however if the property passed by intestacy.11
Under the common law, in intestacy, title immediately vested in the
heirs upon the decedent’s death.12 The heirs could not disclaim.13 To
overcome this common law provision, many of the states enacted legislation specifically granting intestate heirs the right to disclaim.14
Under the common law and the disclaimer statutes in place in many
states before 1976, a donee, devisee and intestate taker had to disclaim
within a reasonable period of time.15 Generally, as to outright devises
and inheritances, the time period ran from the time in which the person
became aware of the devise or inheritance.16 A person who failed to
disclaim within a reasonable period of time was deemed under the law
to have accepted.17 What constituted a reasonable time depended on
the governing state law and the nature of the devise or gift.18 In certain
states, the individual had as short as four months in order to disclaim an
outright devise, while in one state the person had fourteen years.19
10 See People v. Flanagin, 162 N.E. 848, 849-50 (Ill. 1928) (“The law is clear that a
legatee or devisee is under no obligation to accept a testamentary gift. It seems clear that
the law does not compel a man to accept an estate, either beneficial or in trust, against his
will, while it may reasonably presume, in the absence of evidence, that an estate has been
accepted, especially where it is beneficial in its character. . ..It is hardly necessary to add
that no one can make another the owner of an estate against his consent by devising it to
him. . ..”) (quoting Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N.Y. 93, 96 (1855) (internal quotation marks
omitted); 3 WASHBURN ON REAL PROP. § 2478 at 506 (6th ed. 1902)); see also Dare v.
New Brunswick Trust Co., 194 A. 61, 62-63 (N.J. Ch. 1937).
11 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.1; see also K.A. Drechsler, Annotation, Renunciation of Benefit Under Statute of Descent and Distribution, 170 A.L.R. 435, 436
(1947). For a lengthy analysis of the English and American historical development of the
law, see Christian Marius Lauritzen, II, Only God Can Make An Heir, 48 NW. U. L. REV.
568, 569-82 (1954).
12 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.1.
13 Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 572-73; see also Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of
Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109,
112 (2001).
14 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.1. For a list of the states that had statutes in
place in 1978, see Martin, supra note 7, at 319 n.12.
15 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.8; see also HELENE S. SHAPO, GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 170 (Thomson Reuters/West ed., 3d ed. 2012).
16 See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.8; see also SHAPO, BOGERT, & BOGERT,
supra note 15, § 170 & n.2.
17 See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.8.
18 Martin, supra note 7, at 321.
19 Note, Taxation: Disclaimers Under Federal and Minnesota Law, 51 MINN. L. REV.
907, 920 (1967).
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Common and statutory law was uniform on when a future interest
had to be disclaimed.20 To illustrate, assume grantor’s will establishes a
trust which directs all the net income be distributed to a surviving
spouse, W, for W’s life and upon W’s demise, the trust is to be distributed outright to the grantor’s son, A, if he survives W, and if not, then
the trust is to be distributed to A’s then living issue. W has a vested
interest in the trust; W is entitled to current enjoyment of the trust income. Grantor’s son, A, either has a vested interest subject to divestment contingent on surviving W, or a contingent interest.21 A’s issue
have a contingent interest. Neither A nor A’s issue have the right to
current possession or enjoyment of the trust. Prior to 1976, every state
statute permitted A and A’s issue a reasonable period of time to disclaim after being presented with enjoyment of the trust.22 The time to
disclaim did not run from the time of the creation of the interest. Nor
did the time run from the time of knowledge of the interest. Rather, the
beneficiary had a reasonable time to disclaim after being presented with
a current possessory interest.23
B. Federal Tax Law Pre - TRA ’76
Before the changes brought by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, several
sections of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) set forth the federal tax
treatment of disclaimers.24 IRC § 2056(d)(2) provided that a disclaimer
executed within a reasonable period of time and valid under state law
which resulted in property passing to a surviving spouse was deemed to
be a transfer by the decedent with a resulting marital deduction.25 Section 2055(a) contained a similar provision for property passing to charity
as a result of a disclaimer executed within a reasonable period of time
and valid under state law. Sections 2041(a)(2) and 2514(a) provided a
disclaimer or renunciation of a general power of appointment was not
deemed a taxable event. If the disclaimer was not valid under state law,
it was not treated as a disclaimer for federal tax purposes.26 State law
primarily determined the effect of a disclaimer for federal tax
purposes.27
20 SHAPO, BOGERT, & BOGERT, supra note 15, § 171 at 246. See also infra text accompanying note 60.
21 See Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 322 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22 Martin, supra note 7, at 321.
23 Id. at 321 n.22.
24 Id. at 321 n.18.
25 H.R. 438, 80 Stat. 872, Pub. L. 89-621 (Oct. 4 1966) (codified as amended in I.R.C.
§ 2056(d)(2).
26 Ellsworth, supra note 8, at 695-96.
27 Doris D. Blazek & Philip L. O’Donoghue, Use of Disclaimers in Post-Mortem
Planning, in 1 N.Y.U. PROC. FORTIETH INST. ON FED. TAX’N, § 7.02[1], at 7-4 (Nicolas
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Treasury Regulations § 25.2511-1(c) provided that a disclaimer had
to be valid under state law and had to be executed within a reasonable
period of time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer.28 As to a
future interest, the issue arose as to when the pertinent “transfer” occurred. The Regulations did not define whether the creation of the trust
constituted the relevant “transfer” or whether the relevant “transfer”
occurred when the remainder beneficiary was entitled to a distribution
from the trust. In fact, Justice Stevens, writing the opinion of the majority in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Jewett v. Commissioner, noted
“[b]oth positions find support in the language of the Regulation.”29 In
the earlier decision of Keinath v. Commissioner, the Eight Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the Treasury Regulations deferred to state law to
determine whether the disclaimer was executed within a reasonable
time period.30 In Jewett, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Treasury
Regulations required a federal test of reasonableness.31

Liakas ed., 1982); BRAND & LAPIANA, supra note 1, at 48; Ellsworth, supra note 8, at
696.
28 Former Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(c) (1958) provided:
The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions whereby
property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or conferred
upon another, regardless of the means or device employed, constitute gifts subject to tax. See further §25.2512-8. Where the law governing the administration
of the decedent’s estate gives a beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept ownership of property transferred
from a decedent (whether the transfer is effected by the decedent’s will or by
the law of descent and distribution of intestate property), a refusal to accept
ownership does not constitute the making of a gift if the refusal is made within a
reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer. The refusal
must be unequivocable and effective under the local law. There can be no refusal of ownership of property after its acceptance. Where the local law does
not permit such a refusal, any disposition by the beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin
whereby ownership is transferred gratuitously to another constitutes the making
of a gift by the beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin. . .. In the absence of facts to the
contrary, if a person fails to refuse to accept a transfer to him of ownership of a
decedent’s property within a reasonable time after learning of the existence of
the transfer, he will be presumed to have accepted the property. 23 Fed. Reg.
8,904, 8,909-10 (Nov. 15 1958).
29 Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 311 (1982). See infra Part III.C. for an analysis of
this case.
30 Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 61 (8th Cir. 1973), overruled by Jewett v.
Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). See infra Part I.C.9. for an analysis of this case.
31 Jewett, 455 U.S. at 310-11, 316. See infra Part III.C. for an analysis of this case.

Spring/Fall 2013] DISCLAIMERS OF FUTURE INTERESTS

7

C. Call for Legislative Reform
1. H.R. 11450 (October 6, 1965)
Beginning in the 1960s, individuals began to call for legislative reform of the federal tax treatment of disclaimers.32 H.R. 11450, introduced on October 6, 1965, at the request of the American Bar
Association, proposed adding a new section 2518 to the Internal Revenue Code.33 The following explanation was given:
Certain cases have held that renunciation or disclaimers of
property received by inheritance are transfers subject to estate
and gift tax . . . . The differences in result are considered undesirable from the standpoint that similar transactions are not
now treated uniformly for estate and gift tax purposes. Uniformity seems desirable regardless of whether the property interest in question passes from the estate of a decedent dying
testate or intestate, and regardless of the State law applicable
to the passage of title at death.34
The proposed law was directed at providing uniform federal tax treatment for property passing either testate or intestate. The proposed statute did not speak to future interests.

32 In fact, one of the earliest calls for reform dates to 1950. Note, Disclaimers in
Federal Taxation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1051 (1950) (“Explicit Code definition of what
constitutes a disclaimer sufficient to prevent the property from being treated for estate
and gift tax purposes as owned by the disclaimant would minimize the use of disclaimers
for tax evasion and eliminate the present possibility of discrimination based on local
property law. The Code should at least require that a disclaimer be made within a specified short period, in a writing delivered to all persons thereby affected.”); Note, supra
note 19, at 921 (“Disclaimers should be taxed in some uniform manner.”); see also Lawrence Newman & Albert Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests: Continuing Problems
and Suggested Solutions, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827, 837, 840 (1973-1974) (calling for a
federal disclaimer statute and suggesting that the reasonable period of time to disclaim
for a future interest begin at the time the future interest becomes possessory by the
individual).
33 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF
H.R. 11450, A BILL INTRODUCED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND CONTAINING ITS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 72 (Comm. Print 1965).
34 Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISED EXPLANATION OF H.R. 11450, A BILL
INTRODUCED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTAINING ITS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND SUBSEQUENT
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION IN 1965 AND 1966
§ 72 (1967).
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2. ALI Project
At its annual meeting in 1968, the American Law Institute formally
adopted a report by A. James Casner, titled “Reporter’s Study of Dual
Tax System and Unified Tax”35 (hereinafter the “ALI Project”). Section
K of the report publication is entitled “The Disclaimer Problem.” The
report recommends that the Internal Revenue Code define what constitutes a disclaimer so that the federal transfer tax consequences can be
clearly determinable:
The Internal Revenue Code, under either a dual tax system or
a unified tax, should define what constitutes a disclaimer.
Timely redirection of the destination of a property interest
should be regarded as a disclaimer for the purpose of determining the transfer tax consequences of the original transfer,
under either a dual tax system or a unified [transfer] tax.36
The report did not address the time period in which an individual with a
future interest must disclaim. Notably, the Report recommended a disclaimant be permitted to direct to whom the property would pass.37
3. ABA Model Act
In 1968, a Special Committee on Disclaimer Legislation of the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association issued a report containing a Model Disclaimer Act (hereinafter the
“ABA Model Act”) to be submitted to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.38 The committee noted that it is
“generally agreed that a state statute is the best way to achieve a workable, effective law governing disclaimers.”39 The committee noted that
35

A. James Casner, Reporter’s Study of Dual Tax System and Unified Tax, in FED.
GIFT TAX’N: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE A.L.I. AND REP. STUD. 58 (1968).
36 A.L.I., Recommendations of the American Law Institute with Respect to Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation, in FED. EST. AND GIFT TAX’N: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
A.L.I. AND REP. STUD. 40-41 (1968).
37 Id. at 40.
38 Special Comm. on Disclaimer Legis., Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dispositions – Suggestions for a Model Act, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 131,
132 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 Suggestions for a Model Act]. In 1969, the Special Committee on Disclaimer Legislation of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the
American Bar Association issued a final report containing Model Disclaimer Act to be
submitted to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Special
Comm. on Disclaimer Legislation, Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dispositions – Suggestions for Model Acts, 4 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 658, 659 (1969)
[hereinafter 1969 Suggestions for a Model Act]. The pertinent sections concerning when
an individual with a future interest could disclaim were left unchanged. Compare id. at
663-64; with 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J., supra, at 133-34.
39 1968 Suggestions for a Model Act, supra note 38, at 131.
EST.

AND
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some of the reasons for a model act are to authorize the disclaimer of
future interests and to specify a time in which an individual must
disclaim.40
Section 2 of the ABA Model Act provided:
Section 2. TIME AND PLACE OF FILING. The instrument specified in section 1 shall be filed within [10] months after the
death of the decedent or the donee of the power, as the case
may be, or if the taker of the property or interest is not then
finally ascertained or his interest has not become indefeasibly
fixed both in quality and in quantity, then not later than [10]
months after the event when the taker has become finally ascertained and his interest has become indefeasibly fixed both
in quality and in quantity.41
The ABA Model Act did not require that the individual have
knowledge of the property interest. However, since the time period did
not begin to run until the interest was indefeasibly fixed, it is more likely
that the person would be notified of the interest. The ABA Model Act
did not contain an exception for individuals suffering a disability, such
as minority. The comments indicate that an exception is not given in
such circumstances because a disclaimer can be accomplished by court
petition on behalf of those suffering disabilities.42
4. 1969 Committee Hearings
On February 5, 1969, the Committee on Ways and Means of the
U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee of Finance of the
U.S. Senate jointly published a report titled “Tax Reform Studies and
Proposals U.S. Treasury Department”43 (hereinafter the “1969 Treasury
Proposals”). The report attached studies and proposals regarding tax
reform. The Report included a report prepared by a committee chaired
by the former Secretary of the Treasury, Henry H. Fowler, which contained the following comment on disclaimers:
[R]ules governing disclaimers of transferred interests will be
more specifically detailed than in [existing] law. A transferee
will be entitled to disclaim all or part of an interest within 15
months after the transfer, or within 6 months after he learns of
the transfer, [whichever] period ends later, if he has not know40

Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 134.
42 Id. at 137.
43 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS & S. COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG.,
TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT (Comm. Print
1969).
41
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ingly accepted any benefits from or exercised control over the
property.44
Unfortunately, the written comments did not have attached proposed
statutory language. The key question is when a “transfer” occurs for
purposes of a future interest, when the trust was created or when the life
income beneficiary dies. The Treasury’s Proposal did not provide any
insight into this question. Importantly, the Proposal permits an individual six months to disclaim after knowledge of the transfer.45
5. Uniform Probate Code (1969)
In 1969, the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws accepted the recommendations of the ABA Model Act but narrowed the
time in which to disclaim to six months after the interest was finally
ascertained rather than the ten months set forth in the ABA Model
Act.46
6. American Bankers Proposal
In 1973, the American Bankers Association weighed into transfer
tax reform by issuing a report titled: “American Bankers Association,
Discussion Draft of Transfer Tax Statute and Explanatory Comments”47
(hereinafter the “American Bankers Proposal”). Most of its report is
dedicated to proposals to enact a generation-skipping transfer tax, unify
the gift and estate tax, and modify the marital deduction statutes. Section 16 of the report contains the following statutory proposal concerning disclaimers:
Section 16. Disclaimers. (a) General Rule. – If an individual
makes a disclaimer, as defined in subsection (b), in whole or in
part with respect to an interest in property, he shall not
thereby be deemed to have made a transfer under this chapter
or to have possessed the interest for the purposes of this chapter. (b) Definition. – The term “disclaimer” means the irrevocable and unqualified refusal in accordance with local law to
44

Id. at 365.
Id.
46 See Unif. Probate Code § 2-801(b) (1969) (“The writing specified in (a) must be
filed within [6] months after the death of the decedent or the donee of the power, or if
the taker of the property is not then finally ascertained not later than [6] months after the
event by which the taker or the interest is finally ascertained.”) (amended 1998). See
supra Part I.C.3. for a discussion of the ABA Model Act.
47 General Tax Reform (Testimony From Administration and Public Witnesses):
Public Hearings on the Subject of General Tax Reform Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 93d Cong. 3747-958 (1973) (American Bankers Association Discussion Draft of
Transfer Tax Statute and Explanatory Comments).
45
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accept, in whole or in part, an interest in property, but only if
(i) the refusal is by a written statement, made within 9 months
of the interest becoming indefeasibly fixed and filed with the
transferor, his legal representative, or the person who holds the
legal title to the property to which it relates; and (ii) prior to
the refusal, such individual has not waived his right to disclaim,
or accepted the interest or its benefits.48
The Comments contain the following explanation concerning the statutory proposal:
The disclaimer must be made within 9 months of the individual’s interest becoming indefeasibly fixed . . . . The words of
the subsection “indefeasibly fixed” are drawn from a Model
Disclaimer Act drafted by a Special Committee on Disclaimer
Legislation of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association . . . . In describing the
meaning of these words the Special Committee states: “The
phrase . . . is intended to gear the commencement of the . . .
period [within which a disclaimer may be made] to a time when
the existence and extent of the disclaimant’s interest are fully
established and defined. The verb ‘fixed’ is employed rather
than ‘vested’ to avoid the lack of precision in meaning which
the term ‘vested’ involves.” Under this provision an individual
who holds a remainder or similar interest in property may,
without, adverse transfer tax consequences, postpone renouncing his interest until it becomes fully possessory.49
The American Bankers Proposal permitted an individual nine
months to disclaim after becoming indefeasibly fixed.
7. 1973 Committee Hearings
On February 27, 1973, a panel discussion took place before the U.S.
House Committee on Ways and Means.50 James B. Lewis, a New York
lawyer and member of the American Law Institute’s Federal Estate and
48

Id. at 3781-82.
Id. at 3921-22 (internal citation omitted). See supra Part I.C.3. for further analysis
of the ABA Model Act.
50 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D. CONG., PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES INVITED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS TO PARTICIPATE IN PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON TAX REFORM: PANEL
NO. 10 – ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REVISION (Comm. Print 1973); see also STAFF OF H.
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 80-86 (Comm. Print 1976) (containing oral and written
statements from James B. Lewis of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 93d
Congress).
49
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Gift Tax Project, spoke and delivered written comments. His written
comments note:
The American Law Institute also recommends a uniform Federal disclaimer statute. Any beneficiary of a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance of property would have a limited period
within which to renounce the bequest without having the renunciation treated as a taxable transfer. The vagaries of state
law in this area, which have been a breeding ground for litigation, would be replaced by a uniform and understandable Federal rule applicable to all situations.51
The comment seems to suggest a single uniform time period. It should
be borne in mind that the ALI Project would have permitted the disclaimant to direct to whom the property passed and did not specify a time
period at all.52 The ALI Proposal was submitted by the President of the
American Bankers Association, Stetson B. Harman, as part of his presentation to the Committee on Ways and Means on March 29, 1973.53
8. Uniform Disclaimer Acts (1973)
In 1973, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
The Uniform Disclaimer Acts (1973). The treatment of disclaimers was
divided into two separate acts, to wit: (1) The Uniform Disclaimer of
Transfers by Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act and (2) The Uniform
Disclaimer of Transfers Under Non-testamentary Instruments Act. For
the most part, the two acts are identical. Section 2(b) of the Uniform
Disclaimer of Transfers by Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act,
provided:
(b) An instrument disclaiming a future interest shall be filed
not later than [6] months after the event that determines that
the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained and
his interest indefeasibly vested.
The Comments provide:
At common law, no specific time evolved within which disclaimer had to be made. The only requirement was that it be
within a “reasonable” time . . . In the case of future interests
the disclaimer period should run form the time that takers of
51

STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIFEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 86 (Comm. Print 1976).
52 See supra Part I.C.2.
53 General Tax Reform, supra note 47, at 3733 (statement of Stetson B. Harman,
President, American Bankers Association). Professor A. James Casner, Harvard Law
School, also has spoke and presented the ALI Proposal as part of his written submissions.
Professor Casner’s written comments did not address disclaimers. Casner, supra note 35.
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the interest are finally ascertained and their interests indefeasibly fixed.
Section 2(a) of the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers Under Nontestamentary Instruments Act contained an similar provision concerning the
disclaiming of future interests.
9. Keinath v. Commissioner
The landmark case cited by Congress as illustrating the need for
legislative reform is the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
of Keinath v. Commissioner.54 In Keinath, the trust provided the grantor’s wife all of the net income for her life and directed that the trust
property pass to the grantor’s son if he survived his mother (grantor’s
wife), and if not, the property would pass to the son’s issue who survived
grantor’s wife. Grantor’s son served as co-trustee of the trust after its
establishment following grantor’s death. Nineteen years after the grantor’s demise, grantor’s wife died. Grantor’s son executed a disclaimer
within two months of his mother’s demise. The Treasury argued that (1)
a disclaimer made nineteen years after the disclaimant had become
aware of the existence of the trust was not executed within a “reasonable time; ” (2) its regulations required that the time period should be
based on what is reasonable under a federally determined standard; and
(3) the reasonable time period ran from the time the trust was established.55 The court disagreed, noting since there was not a federal statute or regulation defining a reasonable time, one should look to state
law to determine whether the disclaimer was executed within a reasonable time period.56 The court concluded that under the governing state
law, Minnesota, the time period in which to disclaim ran from the time
of the mother’s demise, not from the time of the trust’s creation.57 Since
the son executed a disclaimer within two months of his mother’s (the
income beneficiary’s) demise, the disclaimer was valid under state law
and thus was valid under federal law since federal law deferred to the
state. The court stated,
[t]he appellants [taxpayers] maintain, without any refutation
by the Commissioner, that all of the authorities who have considered this question have concluded that the time in which a
remainder interest subject to divesture must be disclaimed
commences upon the death of the life beneficiary, which in
54 Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), overruled by Jewett v. Comm’r,
455 U.S. 305 (1982); See infra Part II for Congressional references to the case.
55 Keinath, 480 F.2d at 60-61.
56 See Id. at 61.
57 Id. at 62.
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turn allows the remainder interest to be irrevocably fixed not
subject to divestment. We have found no contrary authority
and think that this is the prevailing common law rule, which
also is sound in principle and reason. A remainder subject to
divestment does not convey or transfer any actual control or
current beneficial interest in property to the remainderm[e]n.58
The Court noted that the taxpayer
had really nothing to accept or renounce by way of beneficial
ownership or control of the property until he succeeded in outliving the life beneficiary. When that event occurred he was in
a position to accept or reject the gratuitous devise and would
ordinarily be presumed to have accepted, absent an affirmative
disclaimer executed in accordance with local law and in conformity with Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) respecting
disclaimers.59
The Court noted the law uniformly ran the time period in which to disclaim a future interest from the time of the income beneficiary’s
demise.60
10. America Bar Association Revised Proposal (1974)
In 1974, the Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes of the American
Bar Association recommended adoption of amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code to address disclaimers.61 The Recommendation proposed a new section 2518, which required delivery of a written disclaimer within nine months of the decedent’s death for a present
interest. With respect to a future interest, the disclaimer had to be executed “not later than nine months after the event when the taker of the
interest is finally ascertained and his interest has become indefeasible.”62 The Committee notes,
[t]he Recommendation would eliminate the undesirable situation illustrated in the Keinath case by providing a uniform federal standard for determining the time within which a
disclaimer must be made. In the case of a future interest it
58

Id. at 64.
Id. See infra Part III.C. for a discussion of Keinath getting overturned by Jewett v.
Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). See James C. Crain, Note, Federal Gift Tax—Section
2511—Holder of Vested Remainder Subject to Divestiture has Reasonable Time to Disclaim Interest After Death of Life Beneficiary. Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th
Cir. 1973), 51 TEX. L. REV. 1430, 1433-36 (1973), for a criticism of Keinath.
60 See supra text accompanying note 58.
61 Comm. on Estate and Gift Taxes, To Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1953 to
Provide for Estate and Gift Tax Treatment of Disclaimers, 27 Tax Law. 811, 818 (1974).
62 Id. at 822-23.
59
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would be within nine months after the event when the taker of
the interest is finally ascertained and his interest has become
wholly indefeasible. The result under that test would be the
same as the one reached in Keinath.63
II. THE TAX REFORM

ACT OF

1976 (TRA ’76)

In March 1976, the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S.
House of Representatives conducted public hearings on estate and gift
tax reform. The Committee members were presented with background
materials consisting of the following, among other items: (1) Statement
of James B. Lewis before the Committee on Ways and Means on February 27, 1973;64 (2) Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, U.S. Treasury Department, February 5, 1969;65 (3) 1968 ALI Proposal;66 and (4)
American Bankers Association Discussion Draft of Transfer Tax Statute
and Explanatory Comments.67 Members of both the American Bankers
Association and the American Law Institute spoke at the hearings and
presented reports.68 The American Bankers Association Discussion
Draft proposed a statute which would permit an individual nine months
after a future interest becoming indefeasibly fixed to disclaim.69 The
63

Id. at 819.
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 80-86 (Comm. Print 1976).
65 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS & S. COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG.,
TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT 183-85 (Comm.
Print 1969).
66 Id. at 311 et. seq; See supra Part I(C)(2) and note 35.
67 Id. at 429 et. seq; see supra Part I(C)(6) and note 47.
68 Thomas A. Melfe, Chairman of the Taxation Committee of the American Bankers Association, spoke on March 15, 1976 to the Committee, submitting the American
Bankers Association Discussion Draft of Transfer Tax Statute. See Pub. Hearings and
Panel Discussions on the General Subject of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Before the H.
Comm. On Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 48 (1976) (statement of Thomas A. Melfe,
American Banker’s Association). His oral and written comments did not address disclaimers. Harvard Law Professor A. James Casner, on behalf of the American Law Institute, spoke on March 23, 1976, delivering a copy of the ALI Proposal. See supra Part
I(C)(2). See also Pub. Hearings and Panel Discussions on the General Subject of Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 1333 (1976)
(statement of Prof. A. James Casner). Professor Casner’s oral and written comments did
not address disclaimers. While their oral and written comments did not reference disclaimers, the referenced supplemental submissions did address disclaimers. See supra
Parts I(C)(2) and I(C)(6) for an analysis of both supplemental submissions.
69 See supra Part I.C.6. for a discussion of the proposed statutory language of Section 16 of the American Bankers Association Discussion Draft of Transfer Statute and
Explanatory Comments.
64
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American Law Institute’s proposal would allow a disclaimant to direct
to whom the property passed.70
Section 10(b) of H.R. 14844, Estate and Gift Tax Reform Act, contained proposed disclaimer legislation.71 The bill was referred to the
Ways and Means Committee on July 26, 1976 and referred back to the
House on August 2, 1976. The Report of the Committee of Ways and
Means accompanying H.R. 14844 contains a lengthy discussion on disclaimers, with the following comments directed at the timing issue:
For many of the estate and gift tax provisions described above,
no specific time period is prescribed within which a disclaimer
must be made in order to be recognized for Federal transfer
tax purposes. Except in the case of the treatment of disclaimers affecting the estate tax marital or charitable deductions
(which must be made before the due date), the disclaimer is
required to be made within a “reasonable” time after the person disclaiming learns of the existence of his interest in a property transfer. In one case, a remainderman, who was aware of
his interest, was considered to have made a disclaimer of his
remainder interest within a “reasonable” time for gift tax purposes when he disclaimed shortly after the expiration of a life
tenancy which had continued for 19 years after the grantor’s
death [footnote citation to Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d
57 (8th Cir. 1973)]. The decision in this case might not apply in
other cases involving the same facts depending upon the applicable local law . . . .Your committee believes that definitive
rules concerning disclaimers should be provided for estate and
70

See supra Part I.C.2.
The American College of Probate Counsel, now known as the American College
of Trust & Estate Counsel, took the following position with respect to H.R. 14844:
Disclaimer. Although no provisions dealing with disclaimers and renunciations
appear in the Senate version, the House version contains a set of amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code on this subject. The College believes that in light
of the widespread adoption of the Uniform Disclaimer Act, proposed by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the continued action of state legislatures in this area, and the fact that disclaimer is a postmortem planning devise
used frequently for completely non-tax reasons, it is inappropriate to have these
disclaimer provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. In any case, the proposed
amendments in the House version will create a number of problems because
they are inadequate, technically insufficient, and fail to take into consideration
some of the more complex problems in this field. If they are to be retained in
the final Bill they require considerable revision.
Am. C. Of Prob. Couns., Position of the American College of Probate Counsel with Respect to the Estate and Gift Tax Amendments in Title XXII of HR 10612 and Also in HR
14844 Known as the “Estate and Gift Tax Reform Act of 1976”, 3 PROBATE NOTES, Fall
1976, at 1, 12, 15 (message from the President)
71
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gift tax purposes to achieve uniform treatment. In addition,
your committee believes that a uniform standard should be
provided for determining the time within which a disclaimer
must be made . . . . Under the bill, a “qualified disclaimer”
means an irrevocable and unqualified refusal to accept an interest in property that satisfies four conditions. First, the refusal must be in writing. Second, the written refusal must be
received by the transferor of the interest, his legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property not later
than 9 months after the day on which the transfer creating the
interest is made. However, if later, the period for making the
disclaimer is not to expire in any case until 9 months after the
day on which the person making the disclaimer has attained
age 21.72
H.R. 10612, Tax Reform Act, which originally did not contain a
provision concerning disclaimers, had passed the House on December 4,
1975. The U.S. Senate passed a tax reform bill on August 6, 1976.73 In a
joint Conference Committee, H.R. 14844 was rolled into H.R. 10612. A
Conference Comparison on H.R. 10612 simply noted that the House
Bill “[p]rovides a single set of definitive rules for disclaimers for purposes of estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes.”74
H.R. 10612, incorporating the provisions of H.R. 14844, was signed
by President Gerald Ford on October 4, 1976 and became Public Law
94-455. Section 2009 of Public Law 94-455 amended the Internal Revenue Code to add section 2518.75 Under section 2518, if a person makes a
72

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380 at 66-67 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3420-

21.
73

S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 643 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4029, 2897.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., CONFERENCE COMPARISON ON H.R. 10612: TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 114 (Comm. Print
1976).
75 Section 2518 as set forth in The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§2009(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1893 (Codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2518), read as follows:
SEC. 2518. DISCLAIMERS
(a) GENERAL RULE. For purposes of this subtitle, if a person makes a qualified disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall
apply with respect to such interest as if the interest had never been transferred to such person.
(b) QUALIFIED DISCLAIMER DEFINED. For purposes of subsection (a), the
term “qualified disclaimer” means an irrevocable and unqualified refusal
by a person to accept an interest in property but only if –
(1) such refusal is in writing,
(2) such writing is received by the transferor of the interest, his legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property, to which the interest relates not later than the date which is 9 months after the later of –
74
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qualified disclaimer with respect to an interest in property, the person is
not deemed to have made a gift. In order to constitute a qualified disclaimer, the disclaimer must be in writing and the writing must be “received by the transferor of the interest, his legal representative, or the
holder of the legal title to the property to which the interest relates not
later than the date which is 9 months after the later of – (A) the day on
which the transfer creating the interest in such person is made, or (B)
the day on which such person attains age 21.”76
The Joint Committee on Taxation’s General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 is nearly identical to the Ways and Means Report
accompanying H.R. 14844 with the following addition:
(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in such person
is made, or
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21,
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits, and
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes to a person other than the
person making the disclaimer (without any direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer).
(c) OTHER RULES. For purposes of subsection (a) –
(1) DISCLAIMER OF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF INTEREST. A disclaimer with
respect to an undivided portion of an interest which meets the requirements of the preceding sentence shall be treated as a qualified disclaimer of
such portion of the interest.
(2) POWERS. A power with respect to property shall be treated as an interest in such property.
Section 2518(b)(4) was amended by section 702(m)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 to read as follows:
(b)(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any direction on
the part of the person making the disclaimer either –
(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or
(B) to a person other than the person making the disclaimer.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §426(a), 95 Stat. 171, 318
amended Section 2518 by inserting at the end thereof a new subsection (c)(3) to read as
follows:
(c) CERTAIN TRANSFERS TREATED AS DISCLAIMERS. – A written transfer of the
transferor’s entire interest in the property –
(A) which meets requirements similar to the requirements of paragraphs
(2) and (3) of subsection (b), and
(B) which is to a person or persons who would have received the property
had the transferor made a qualified disclaimer (within the meaning of subsection (b)), shall be treated as a qualified disclaimer.
PL 97–448, § 104, 96 Stat 2365 further amended the statute as follows:
(e) Amendment Related to Section 426.—, // 95 Stat. 318. // Paragraph (3) of
section 2518(c) // 26 USC 2518. // (relating to disclaimers) is amended by striking out “For purposes of subsection (a), a” and inserting in lieu thereof “A”.
No other amendments have been made to Section 2518 than those stated in this footnote.
76 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2). This subsection of §2518 has not been amended since its enactment in 1976. See Id.
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The Congress intended to make it clear that the 9-month period for making a disclaimer is to be determined in reference to
each taxable transfer. For example, in the case of a general
power of appointment, where the other requirements are satisfied, the person who would be the holder of the power will
have a 9-month period after the creation of the power in which
to disclaim and the person to whom the property would pass by
reason of the exercise or lapse of the power would have a 9month period after a taxable exercise, etc., by the holder of the
power in which to disclaim. Further, in the case where the
transfer is for the life of an income beneficiary with remainder
to another person, both the life tenant and the remainderman
would have to disclaim with the 9-month period after the transfer is made.77
Congress enacted disclaimer reform at the request of professional
organizations.78 The legislative history indicates that reform was sought
to provide a level of uniformity as to federal disclaimer law. Congress
sought to enact legislation to end the confusion caused by the “reasonable” time standard in Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(c).79 The Keinath case is
mentioned in both the Congressional reports and the Joint Committee
on Taxation’s report as evidence of the degree of inconsistency in the
law.80 The legislative history provides no insight into why Congress required a disclaimer be executed within nine months of creation of the
interest. The Congressional record contains no discussion of the equities of requiring a disclaimer be executed within a certain time period
without regard to the possibility that the disclaimant may not be aware
of the existence of the trust. Over a century of common law required
that a disclaimant be given a reasonable time period after becoming
aware of the inheritance before being forced to accept an inheritance.81
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, without any written record discussing the
issue, deemed an individual to have accepted an inheritance for tax purposes regardless of the fact that the person may not even be aware of
the existence of the inheritance. In addition, the record contains no discussion as to the equities of requiring someone to disclaim an inheritance which they will not come into possession for years, and possible
77

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 591 (Comm. Print 1976).
78 Blazek & O’Donoghue, supra note 27, § 7.02[2], at 7-6.
79 Id. at 7-7. See supra note 28 for a reproduction of Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(C).
80 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380 at 66 & n.342 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356,
3420.
81 See, e.g., Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 61-62 (8th Cir. 1973), overruled by
Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); Strom v. Wood, 164 P. 1100, 1102 (Kan. 1917);
Perkins v. Isley, 32 S.E.2d 588, 591 (N.C. 1945).
THE
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decades, after the time period in which they are to disclaim. Since the
gift tax treatment of a non-qualified disclaimer may be costly, TRA ‘76
essentially removed the common law right to disclaim for many
taxpayers.
When considering changes to the federal treatment of disclaimers
in 1976, Congress had before it numerous proposals from professional
organizations. All of these proposals would have permitted a disclaimer
to be executed within a period of time after the individual was presented
with a current possessory interest.82 Without any discussion or precedent of any nature, Congress enacted a statute, which ran the time period for all interests from the time of the interest’s creation.83
III. POST TRA ’76
A. Subsequent Modifications to IRC § 2518
Section 2518, as enacted in the 1976 Act, and as it remains today,
requires that a disclaimer be executed within nine months of creation of
the interest, unless an exception exists.84 Section 2518 was amended by
the Revenue Act of 1978 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.85
These amendments did not modify the timing requirement.

82

See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A); In Merle A. Wolfson, Disclaimers–A Device Whose Time
Has Come? Problems and Possibilities for the Elimination or Reduction of Estate and Gift
Taxes by Post–Transfer Fine Tuning Under Section 2518, 2 N.Y.U. 41ST ANN. INST. ON
FED. TAX’N, § 43.03[3], at 43-8 (1983), the author notes:
83

While the new statutory language clearly incorporates the requirement that the
critical date for measuring the nine-month requirement be related to the date of
the transfer creating the interest, the committee reports offer no explanation for
adoption of such date. Congress was obviously disturbed by the assumed finding in the Keinath case that 19 years after knowledge of the transfer creating the
interest did not constitute an unreasonable time. . .. Congress reversed Keinath
with a vengeance. It made the date of the transfer creating the interest determinative, irrespective of whether or not the beneficiary was aware of its existence,
thereby, exceeding even the restrictive language of the prior regulation. While
Congress complained bitterly about the reasonableness issue, emphasizing it by
twice identifying the term “reasonable” in quotes, it was totally silent with regard to the extraordinary policy change involved in adopting the date of the
transfer creating the interest as the criteria and eliminating the knowledge requirement. Did Congress know what it was doing? It would appear unlikely.
84 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
85 See supra note 75 for the changes made by § 2518 to these two acts.
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B. Treasury Regulations § 25.2518-2
In 1986, the Treasury issued Final Regulations governing disclaimers to incorporate changes made by TRA ‘76.86
86 Qualified Disclaimers of Property, 51 Fed. Reg. 28365-1, 28371 (Aug. 7, 1986)
(codified as amended in Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2) provides:
§ 25.2518-2 Requirements for a qualified disclaimer.

(a) In general. For the purposes of section 2518(a), a disclaimer shall be a
qualified disclaimer only if it satisfies the requirements of this section. In
general, to be a qualified disclaimer—
(1) The disclaimer must be irrevocable and unqualified;
(2) The disclaimer must be in writing;
(3) The writing must be delivered to the person specified in paragraph (b)
(2) of this section within the time limitations specified in paragraph (c)(1)
of this section;
(4) The disclaimant must not have accepted the interest disclaimed or any
of its benefits; and
(5) The interest disclaimed must pass either to the spouse of the decedent
or to a person other than the disclaimant without any direction on the part
of the person making the disclaimer.
(b) Writing—(1) Requirements. A disclaimer is a qualified disclaimer only
if it is in writing. The writing must identify the interest in property disclaimed and be signed either by the disclaimant or by the disclaimant’s legal representative.
(2) Delivery. The writing described in paragraph (b) (1) of this section
must be delivered to the transferor of the interest, the transferor’s legal
representative, the holder of the legal title to the property to which the
interest relates, or the person in possession of such property.
(c) Time limit—(1) In general. A disclaimer is a qualified disclaimer only if
the writing described in paragraph (b) (1) of this section is delivered to the
persons described in paragraph (b) (2) of this section no later than the date
which is 9 months after the later of—
(i) The date on which the transfer creating the interest in the disclaimant is
made, or
(ii) The day on which the disclaimant attains age 21.
(2) A timely mailing of a disclaimer treated as a timely delivery. Although
section 7502 and the regulations under that section apply only to documents to be filed with the Service, a timely mailing of a disclaimer to the
person described in paragraph (b) (2) of this section is treated as a timely
delivery if the mailing requirements under paragraphs (c) (1), (c) (2) and
(d) of § 301.7502-1 are met. Further, if the last day of the period specified
in paragraph (c) (1) of this section falls on Saturday, Sunday or a legal
holiday (as defined in paragraph (b) of § 301.7503-1), then the delivery of
the writing described in paragraph (b) (1) of this section shall be considered
timely if delivery is made on the first succeeding day which is not Saturday,
Sunday or a legal holiday. See paragraph (d) (3) of this section for rules
applicable to the exception for individuals under 21 years of age.
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(3) Transfer. For purposes of the time limitation described in paragraph (c)
(1) (i) of this section, the 9-month period for making a disclaimer generally
is to be determined with reference to the taxable transfer creating the interest in the disclaimant. With respect to inter vivos transfers, a taxable transfer occurs when there is a completed gift for Federal gift tax purposes
regardless of whether a gift tax is imposed on the completed gift. Thus, gifts
qualifying for the gift tax annual exclusion under section 2503(b) are regarded as taxable transfers for this purpose. With respect to transfers made
by a decedent at death or transfers which become irrevocable at death, a
taxable transfer occurs upon the date of the decedent’s death. However,
where there is a taxable transfer of an interest for Federal gift tax purposes
and such interest is later included in the transferor’s gross estate for Federal
estate tax purposes, the 9-month period for making a qualified disclaimer is
determined with reference to the earlier taxable transfer. In the case of a
general power of appointment, the holder of the power has a 9-month period after the creation of the power in which to disclaim. A person to whom
any interest in property passes by reason of the exercise or lapse of a general power may disclaim such interest within a 9-month period after the
exercise or lapse. In the case of a nongeneral power of appointment, the
holder of the power, permissible appointees, or takers in default of appointment must disclaim within a 9-month period after the original taxable transfer that created or authorized the creation of the power. If the transfer is
for the life of an income beneficiary with succeeding interests to other persons, both the life tenant and the other remaindermen, whether their interests are vested or contingent, must disclaim no later than 9 months after the
original taxable transfer. In the case of a remainder interest in property
which an executor elects to treat as qualified terminable interest property
under section 2056(b)(7), the remainderman must disclaim within 9 months
of the transfer creating the interest, rather than 9 months from the date
such interest is subject to tax under section 2044 or 2519. A person who
receives an interest in property as the result of a qualified disclaimer of the
interest must disclaim the previously disclaimed interest no later than 9
months after the date of the taxable transfer creating the interest in the
preceding disclaimant. Thus, if A were to make a qualified disclaimer of a
specific bequest and as a result of the qualified disclaimer the property
passed as part of the residue, the beneficiary of the residue could make a
qualified disclaimer no later than 9 months after the date of the testator’s
death. See paragraph (d)(3) of this section for the time limitation rule with
reference to recipients who are under 21 years of age.
(4) Joint property—(i) In general. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this section, a qualified disclaimer under section 2518(a)
of an interest or any portion of an interest in a joint tenancy or a tenancy by
the entirety must be made no later than 9 months after the transfer creating
the tenancy. Thus, a surviving joint tenant cannot disclaim any part of the
interest, including the survivorship interest, if more than 9 months have
passed since the transfer creating the joint tenancy. In addition, a joint tenant cannot make a qualified disclaimer of any portion of the joint interest
attributable to consideration furnished by that tenant.
(ii) Tenancies in real property between spouses created before 1982. In the
case of joint tenancies between spouses or a tenancy by the entirety in real
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With one exception, a disclaimer must be executed within nine
months of the creation of the interest.87 The only exception to this ninemonth requirement permits a minor nine months after turning twentyone years of age to disclaim the interest.88 The time period does not run
until the transfer is complete for gift tax purposes.89 If there is a transproperty created after 1976 and before 1982 where no election was made
under section 2515, the surviving spouse must make a qualified disclaimer
no later than 9 months after the date of death of the first spouse to die.
Such a qualified disclaimer will be effective for—
(A) The entire joint interest (except any portion attributable to consideration furnished by the surviving spouse) if the date of death of the deceased
spouse is before 1982; or
(B) One-half the value of the joint interest if the date of death of the deceased spouse is after 1981.
See examples (7) and (8) under paragraph (c)(5) of this section.
(5) Examples. The provisions of paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) of this
section may be illustrated by the following examples. For purposes of the
following examples, assume that all beneficiaries are over 21 years of age.
Example (1). On May 13, 1978, in a transfer which constitutes a completed
gift for Federal gift tax purposes, A creates a trust in which B is given a
lifetime interest in the income from the trust. B is also given a nongeneral
testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of the trust. The power
of appointment may be exercised in favor of any of the issue of A and B. If
there are no surviving issue at B’s death or if the power is not exercised, the
corpus is to pass to E. On May 13, 1978, A and B have two surviving children, C and D. If A, B, C or D wishes to make a qualified disclaimer, the
disclaimer must be made no later than 9 months after May 13, 1978.
Example (2). Assume the same facts as in example (1) except that B is
given a general power of appointment over the corpus of the trust. B exercises the general power of appointment in favor of C upon B’s death on
June 17, 1989. C may make a qualified disclaimer no later than 9 months
after June 17, 1989. If B had died without exercising the general power of
appointment, E could have made a qualified disclaimer no later than 9
months after June 17, 1989.
Example (3). F creates a trust on April 1, 1978, in which F’s child G is to
receive the income from the trust for life. Upon G’s death, the corpus of
the trust is to pass to G’s child H. If either G or H wishes to make a qualified disclaimer, it must be made no later than 9 months after April 1, 1978.

87
88
89

Example (4). A creates a trust on February 15, 1978, in which B is named
the income beneficiary for life. The trust further provides that upon B’s
death the proceeds of the trust are to pass to C, if then living. If C predeceases D, the proceeds shall pass to D or D’s estate. To have timely disclaimers for purposes of section 2518, B, C, and D must disclaim their
respective interests no later than 9 months after February 15, 1978.
I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 2518(b)(2)(B).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3).

24

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:1

fer creating an interest in property during the grantor’s life, which is
complete for gift tax purposes and such interest is later included in the
grantor’s federal gross estate, the 9-month period runs from the date in
which the gift was complete, rather than from estate tax inclusion.90 As
for future interests, the person must disclaim within nine months of the
creation of the interest.91 For example, assume a testamentary trust
provides income to decedent’s spouse for his remaining life with remainder to decedent’s daughter, D, if D survives the decedent’s spouse, and
if not, then the remainder passes to D’s then surviving issue, E and F.
Under the Treasury Regulations, decedent’s surviving spouse, D, E and
F have nine months from the time of decedent’s death to disclaim if they
wish to disclaim.92 The time period runs on vested interests, vested interest subject to divestment, and contingent interests in like manner.
The remainder beneficiary of a testamentary qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) trust has within nine months of the creator’s death
to execute a qualified disclaimer.93 The subsequent inclusion of the
QTIP trust in the surviving spouse’s estate does not begin a new time
period for disclaiming.94 The nine-month time period runs regardless of
the individual’s knowledge of the existence of the trust.
An individual, who is granted a power of appointment, whether
general or specific, whether inter vivos or testamentary, must disclaim
within nine months of the creation of the interest, unless the individual
is a minor.95 The person to whom property has been appointed as a
result of the exercise of a general power of appointment and the default
takers of a general power of appointment have a nine month period
after the exercise, release, or lapse of general power of appointment to
disclaim, regardless of whether the exercise, release, or lapse is subject
to estate or gift tax.96
The person to whom property has been appointed as a result of the
exercise of a non-general, also known as a “limited power of appointment,” and the default takers of a limited power of appointment, must
disclaim within the nine-month period that created or authorized the
creation of the limited power of appointment.97 This rule applies regardless of how broad or narrow the limited power is, provided the
90

Id.
Id.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. Thus, for example, it is immaterial that the holder of the general power of
appointment does not pay gift tax due to protection by the holder’s applicable exclusion
amount. See id.
97 Id.
91
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power is not considered a general power of appointment. Thus, the appointees of a power which may be exercised in favor of anyone other
than the power holder, the power holder’s estate or the creditors of the
power holder’s estate, have nine months in which to disclaim, even
though the class of appointees would include every occupant of the
globe, except those to whom the power holder has outstanding debt.98
C. Jewett v. Commissioner99
In Jewett, the Supreme Court was faced with facts extremely similar
to those in Keinath v. Commissioner.100 In Jewett, taxpayer’s grandmother’s will established a trust, which directed that all of the trust income be distributed to her husband, taxpayer’s grandfather, during his
life. Upon grandfather’s death, the trust income was to be distributed to
taxpayer’s parents for their lives. Upon the death of the surviving parent, the trust was to be distributed equally to taxpayer and his brother if
then living and if not, then to each of their issue. Grandmother died in
1939. Grandfather and taxpayer’s father died prior to 1972. In 1972,
when taxpayer was 45 years old, and 33 years after the trust was created,
he attempted to disclaim his future interest in the trust. Taxpayer’s
mother was alive when the taxpayer executed the disclaimers so at the
time that taxpayer executed the disclaimers he had not become indefeasibly vested in the trust.101 Taxpayer never received any benefit from
the trust and was not entitled to income or principal until his mother’s
death. His interest was vested subject to divestment or contingent at the
time he executed the disclaimers. It was undisputed that the taxpayer
had been aware of the existence of the trust for many years and that his
disclaimers were valid under the governing state law.102 Note, IRC
§ 2518 did not apply because the disclaimers were executed prior to its
enactment.103 Thus, before the Supreme Court issued its opinion, the
new law had been in place for over six years.
98 Paul N. Frimmer, Proposed Regs Under Section 2518 Explain and Expand the
Federal Disclaimer Statute, 53 J. TAX’N 266, 268 (“However, if the class of permissible
appointees is so broad as to render it impossible to determine whether a potential individual will become an appointee, the rule is extremely harsh.”).
99 Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982).
100 Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973) overruled by Jewett v. Comm’r,
455 U.S. 305 (1982). See supra Part I.C.9. for a detailed analysis of Keinath v. Comm’r.
101 See Jewett, 455 U.S. at 306. The taxpayer executed two disclaimers. Initially, he
disclaimed 95% of his interest in the trust and subsequently executed a disclaimer of the
balance of his interest in the trust. Id. at 306-07. Both disclaimers were executed before
his mother died. Id.
102 Id. at 310-11.
103 The disclaimers were executed in 1972 while the statute was first enacted in 1976.
See id. at 306; I.R.C. § 2518.
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In my opinion, the case illustrates the court’s extreme deference
given to the Treasury’s interpretation of its own regulations.104 The
Treasury argued its regulations required that a disclaimer be made
within a reasonable time after the disclaimant became aware of the interest and that the term “reasonableness” should be determined under a
federal standard.105 The taxpayer argued that the same regulations required one to look to the applicable state law to determine what a reasonable period of time was. To give effect to the reasonableness
requirement, Justice Stevens argued that it was necessary that the reasonableness time requirement be determined under federal law.106 Justice Stevens stated “[t]he narrow question presented is whether the
‘transfer’ referred to in the Regulation occurs when the interest is created, as the Government contends, or at a later time when the interest
either vests or becomes possessory, as argued by [the taxpayer].”107 The
court held the time ran from the time of trust creation.108 Having
reached that conclusion, the court went on to hold that a disclaimer executed 24 years after the beneficiary turned age 21 was not executed
within a reasonable period of time.109
Interestingly the court applied the same test as set forth in IRC
§ 2518 as enacted in TRA ‘76. By deferring to the Commissioner’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, the court applied a time standard, which ran from the time of creation. The majority opinion did not
examine whether it would be reasonable to apply such a standard.
Justice Blackmun, writing the dissenting opinion in which Justices
Rehnquist and O’Connor joined, noted the ambiguity in the Regulations, and stated:
The beneficiary of a contingent remainder or, as the Court
seems to suggest here, ante, at [308], n. 5, of ‘a vested remainder subject to divestiture,’ however, may never realize anything by way of actual enjoyment of income or corpus. The
contingencies upon which enjoyment depends may never
ripen. In particular, the contingent beneficiary may die while
104 In Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318, Justice Stevens writing the majority opinion states:
“The Commissioner’s interpretation of the Regulation has been consistent over the years
and is entitled to respect. This canon of construction, which generally applies to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. . . is even more forceful when
applied to Commissioner’s interpretation of his own Regulation.” Treas. Reg. §25.25111(c) was the Regulation at issue. See supra note 28 in which the Regulation is reproduced.
105 See Jewett, 455 U.S. at 307.
106 See id. at 316.
107 Id. at 306.
108 See id. at 311-12, 319.
109 See id. at 318-19.
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the life beneficiary still lives. . . .110 Petitioner has realized no
benefit from the trust and never will have any benefit if he
predeceases his mother. It is the contingency event that is important and makes sense in the consideration of any disclaimer. . . .111 The law of disclaimer is founded on the basic
property-law concepts that a transfer is not complete until its
acceptance by the recipient, and that no person can be forced
to accept property against his will. A transferor chooses the
recipients of the transferred property; a disclaimant makes no
such selection, for that selection has been made by the trustor.
Petitioner’s disclaimers merely renounced any future right to
receive corpus of the trust; they did not direct or even purport
to direct the future distribution of that corpus. . . .112 The remainderman ‘had really nothing to accept or renounce by way
of beneficial ownership or control of the property until he succeeded in outliving the life beneficiary’. . . .113 There is nothing
unfair or improper in allowing the remainderman to wait until
the life beneficiary’s death and then decide whether to accept
the bequest. . . .114 The Commissioner stresses repeatedly the
number of years that elapsed between the death of the testatrix
and the execution of the disclaimers. . . .But to require the disclaimer long before the interest could ripen into enjoyment
means that the decision must be made at a time when the disclaimant does not know what he is disclaiming or whether he
ever would receive and enjoy any interest.115
The minority opinion is the better-reasoned opinion.
D. Legislative Proposals to Amend IRC § 2518
The harshness of Section 2518 has resulted in several proposed
amendments to revise the effective date provisions. A Joint Committee
on Taxation Report dated February 14, 1990 outlined a tax proposal
which would permit an individual to disclaim within a specified period
after the disclaimant’s interest vests if the property interest was created
prior to 1942.116 Similar proposals were made in 1993 and 1995 with
respect to interests created prior to November 15, 1958 if the disclaimer
110

Id. at 322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 323.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 325 (quoting Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 64 (8th Cir. 1973)).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 328.
116 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., EXPLANATION OF MISCELLANEOUS TAX PROPOSALS 28-30 (Joint Comm. Print 1990).
111
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was made before May 22, 1972 and no later than a reasonable time after
the interest vested or became possessory.117 The Joint Committee comments to both bills note the May 22, 1972 date is the date of the U.S. Tax
Court’s decision in Keinath v. Commissioner.118 These tax relief proposals were never enacted.
E. Uniform Laws Post -TRA ’76
1. Uniform Probate Code (1982)
The 1982 revised Uniform Probate Code continued the same concept concerning the time in which to disclaim a future interest as its
predecessor the Uniform Probate Code (1969).119 It provided, in Subsection 2-801(b), the following:
(2) An instrument renouncing a future interest may be filed
not later than [9] months after the event determining that the
taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained and his
interest is indefeasibly vested.120
The Comments provided,
At common law, no specific time evolved within which disclaimer had to be made. The only requirement was that it be
within a “reasonable” time . . . . As a result, divergent holdings
were reached by the courts . . . . Subsection (b) fixes a definite
time for filing of disclaimers. This approach follows the pattern of the Federal estate tax law which prescribed the time for
filing estate tax returns in terms of the decedent’s death. The
time allowed should overlast the time for filing claims and contesting the will and enable the executor or administrator to
know with certainty who the takers of the estate will be. On
the other hand, it should not be so long as to work against an
early determination of the acceptance or rejection of succession to an estate, or increase the risk of inadvertent acceptance
of the benefits of the property, creating an estoppel. In the
case of future interests the disclaimer period should run from
the time the takers of the interest are finally ascertained and
their interest indefeasibly fixed . . . . In the case of future inter117

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTION OF MISCELLATAX PROPOSALS 86 (Joint Comm. Print 1993); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH
CONG., DESCRIPTION OF MISCELLANEOUS TAX PROPOSALS 77 (Joint Comm. Print 1995).
118 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 1993, supra note 117, AT 86 n.36; JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 1995, supra note 117, AT 77 n.42. See supra Part I.C.9. for an analysis of
Keinath v. Commissioner.
119 See supra Part I.C.5.
120 Unif. Probate Code § 2-801(b) (1982).
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ests it should be noted that the person need not wait until the
occurrence of the determinative event before filing a disclaimer, but may do so at any time after the death of the decedent or donee, so long as it is made “not later than” the
prescribed period . . . . A “reasonable time” for gift tax purposes is not defined in the Code or regulations. It has been
held that the courts will look to the law of the states in determining the question . . .121
The 1990 revision to the Uniform Probate Code continued the provision of the 1982 Act that a disclaimer of a future interest had to be
disclaimed within nine months “after the event determining that the
taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained and his [or her]
interest is indefeasibly vested.”122
2. Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Acts (1978)
The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (1978) (hereinafter the “UDPIA (1978)”) divided the disclaimer provisions into three
acts, to wit: (1) The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act
(1978), (2) Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers by Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act (1978) and (3) The Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers
Under Non-Testamentary Instruments Act (1978). For the most part,
the provisions of each act are identical.
The Prefatory Note to the UDPIA (1978) provides,
As respects the time for making disclaimer, the common law
imposed only a requirement of reasonableness. The Conference concluded that a specific period had merit and suggests 9
months. The longer the time allowed, the greater the risk of
conduct inconsistent with rejection of the gift and indicative of
implied acceptance; the shorter the time allowed, the greater
the risk of not having full information for intelligent action.
Section 2(b) of the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers Under Non-Testamentary Instruments Act provides that a future interest arising under a
non-testamentary instrument may be disclaimed
not later than [9] months after the event determining that the
taker of the property or interest has become finally ascertained
and his interest indefeasibly vested. If the person entitled to
disclaim does not have actual knowledge of the existence of
the interest, the disclaimer shall be delivered not later than [9]
121 Id. § 2-801(b) cmt. Background (citing Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 61 (8th
Cir. 1973).
122 Unif. Probate Code § 2-801(b)(2) (1990).
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months after he has actual knowledge of the existence of the
interest.
Section 2(c) of the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers Under Non-Testamentary Instruments Act provided that a disclaimer made after December 31, 1976 and subject to the federal transfer tax had to be made
within nine months of the later of the date the transfer is made or the
day on which the person disclaiming attains age 21. The Prefatory Note
indicates:
As to the time for making disclaimer, the Acts incorporate the
time requirements of Section 2518 only for disclaimers which
are subject to that Section and which specifically state that they
are intended to qualify thereunder; the preexisting (and generally more liberal) time requirements have been retained for
disclaimers not subject to that Section or not intended to qualify thereunder.
Both the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers by Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act (1978) and the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers Under
Non-Testamentary Instruments Act (1978) tract the language of sections
2(b) and 2(c) of the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers Under Non-Testamentary Instruments Act.123
3. Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Acts (1999)
In 1999, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
Uniform Disclaimer Property Interests Acts (1999). Section 13 of the
Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act establishes the only bar to
a disclaimer by providing,
(b) A disclaimer of an interest in property is barred if any of
the following events occur before the disclaimer becomes
effective:
(1) the disclaimant accepts the interest sought to be
disclaimed;
(2) the disclaimant voluntarily assigns, conveys, encumbers, pledges, or transfers the interest sought to be disclaimed or contracts to do so; or
(3) a judicial sale of the interest sought to be disclaimed
occurs.
123 See Unif. Disclaimer of Transfers by Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act (1978);
Unif. Disclaimer of Transfers Under Non-Testamentary Instruments Act (1978); Unif.
Disclaimer of Transfers Under Non-Testamentary Instruments Act § 2(b)-(c) (1978).
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4. Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Acts (2002)124
The current revised Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act
(2002, last revised or amended 2010), notes: “[b]ecause a disclaimer is a
refusal to accept, the only bar to a disclaimer should be acceptance of
the offer.”125
Section 5(a) provides “[a] person may disclaim, in whole or part,
any interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment. A person may disclaim the interest or power even if its creator
imposed a spendthrift provision or similar restriction on transfer or a
restriction or limitation on the right to disclaim.” The Comment to section 5(a) notes,“[t]his provision follows from the principle behind all disclaimers – no one can be forced to accept property – and extends that
principle to powers over property.”
Section 6(a)(1) defines a “future interest” as “an interest that takes
effect in possession or enjoyment, if at all, later than the time of its creation.” Section 6(a)(2) defines the “time of distribution” as “when a disclaimed interest would have taken effect in possession or enjoyment.”126
124 See Adam J. Hirsch, The Code Breakers: How States Are Modifying the Uniform
Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 325 (2011), for a
discussion of which states have enacted the statute and what modifications the adopting
states have made to the Uniform Statute.
125 UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACTS, prefatory note, at 1 (amended
2010).
126 The Comment to Section 6 provides:

The second defined term, “time of distribution,” is used in determining to whom
the disclaimed interest passes (see below). Possession or enjoyment is a term of
art and means that time at which it is certain to whom the property belongs. It
does not mean that the person actually has the property in hand. For example,
the time of distribution of present interests created by will and all interests arising under the law of intestate succession is the death of the decedent. At that
moment the heir or devisee is entitled to his or her devise or share, and it is
irrelevant that time will pass before the will is admitted to probate and that
actual receipt of the gift may not occur until the administration of the estate is
complete. The time of distribution of present interests created by non-testamentary instruments generally depends on when the instrument becomes irrevocable. Because the recipient of a present interest is entitled to the property as soon
as the gift is made, the time of distribution occurs when the creator of the interest can no longer take it back. The time of distribution of a future interest is the
time when it comes into possession and the owner of the future interest becomes the owner of a present interest. For example, if B is the owner of the
remainder interest in a trust which is to pay income to A for life, the time of
distribution of B’s remainder is A’s death. At that time the trust terminated and
B’s ownership of the remainder becomes outright ownership of the trust
property.
Id. § 6 cmt. at 170-71
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Individuals Should Be Able to Disclaim
For centuries the common law has recognized the right of a person
to refuse to accept a gift or devise.127 The law was premised on the concept that an individual could not be forced to take an asset he or she did
not want.128 The only exception to this fundamental right involved
property passing by intestacy.129 The common law forbade an intestate
heir from disclaiming.130 This exception to the general rule rested on
principles developed centuries ago in England based on principles that
had no real application in the United States.131 Some commentators
have asserted that the right to disclaim is a fundamental property
right.132 Individuals should not be forced to accept assets they do not
want; instead, individuals should be able to disclaim.133
B. Beneficiaries Should Have a Reasonable Time to Disclaim
The common law granted donees and devisees a reasonable period
of time to disclaim.134 Individuals were permitted a reasonable time to
disclaim after their interest became indefeasibly vested or possessory.135 The UDPIA (1978) permits an individual, within nine months of
becoming indefeasibly invested in a future interest, to disclaim.136 The
127

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
129 See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.1; see also K.A. Drechsler, supra note 11.
130 See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.1.
131 As noted by Christian Marius Lauritzen, II, landowners had a duty in feudal England to defend the crown. It was important for land to devolve quickly and clearly upon
death so the defense obligation could pass immediately to the devisee. See Lauritzen,
supra note 11, at 569-70.
132 See Edward T. Roehner & Sheila M. Roehner, Renunciation as Taxable Gift – An
Unconstitutional Federal Tax Decision, 8 TAX L. REV. 289, 294 (1952-53).
133 In Note, Taxation, supra note 19, at 908-09, the author notes:
The traditional argument for allowing tax-insulated disclaimers is that a person
should not be forced to accept property with the concomitant burdens and responsibilities inherent in ownership. Therefore, he should have the right of rejection without being subject to a gift tax liability. Since any tax on a disclaimer
would have to be predicated on control over the property rather than enjoyment or possession, it is arguably unfair to predicate tax liability on control
limited to the choice of accepting an interest or allowing it to pass to those
entitled to take as a result of the disclaimer.
Id; See also S. Alan Medlin, An Examination of Disclaimers Under UPS Section 2-801, 55
ALB. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1992) (“The conceptual justification underlying the recognition
of a disclaimer is manifestly simple: a person should be able to refuse a gift.”).
134 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
135 See Martin, supra note 7, at 323 n. 29.
136 See supra Part III.E.2.
128
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UDPIA (1999) does not contain a time restriction on when a disclaimer
must be executed.137 Rather, an individual must disclaim before acceptance.138 Numerous states have adopted the UDPIA (1999) or subsequent versions thereof.139 Individuals should have a reasonable period
of time in which to disclaim.
C. The Time in Which to Disclaim Should Not Begin Until the
Recipient Is Aware of the Interest
Prior to TRA ‘76, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) permitted an individual a reasonable time to disclaim after knowledge of the interest.140 IRC
§ 2518 does not require knowledge. Under § 2518, the period of time in
which to execute a qualified disclaimer expires nine months from the
time of the creation of the interest with the sole exception being that a
minor has an extended time period in which to disclaim.141 There is no
logical justification for running the time period in which to disclaim on
an individual who is not even aware of the existence of the trust.142 If
the time to disclaim has run before an individual is aware of the property transfer, practically speaking they are precluded from disclaiming
because of the gift tax ramifications of disclaiming. It seems unjust to
137

See supra Part III.E.3.
See supra Part III.E.3.
139 See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT (2010), available at http://www
.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (last viewed Apr.
23, 2014).
140 See supra note 28, which reproduces the Regulations.
141 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A)-(B).
142 The following comments by George M. Schain, The Effective Disclaimer, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 29 (1984) provide:
Although the termination of the distinction between present and future interests may promote consistent treatment among taxpayers, this interpretation of
section 2518 places an extremely harsh burden on the holder of a contingent
remainder interest. The section forces the holder to make a decision to accept
or refuse property he may never own. Furthermore, section 2518 requires that
the holder of the future interest evaluate the potential appreciation or depreciation of a piece of property he may not receive until many years later when his
financial status may be substantially different from his present situation. This is
especially burdensome when one considers the fact that knowledge is not longer
necessary to trigger the time period for disclaiming.
Theoretically, a person would have to write a disclaimer to each of his relatives
and friends every nine months to avoid being subject to ownership of those
interests. Although an absurd example, this clearly illustrates the unfair position
in which section 2518 places the holder of a future interest without knowledge.
It seems that such a situation cannot be justified if the old common law principle
upon which disclaimers were founded still stands.
See also John H. Martin, supra note 7, at 333 n.69 (“It is unreasonable to expect a refusal
to be articulated if the intended recipient is unaware that he has been offered
something.”).
138
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force an individual to accept an interest he or she does not want and of
which interest he or she is not even aware.143 The right to disclaim was
an inherent right under the common law and under the statutes in most
states, prohibiting a person from exercising that right by taxing them for
doing so seems improper, and according to one commentator “clearly
oppressive.”144 One commentator has asserted the “elimination of the
knowledge requirement may well run afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution.”145 The time in which to disclaim should not
begin until the recipient is aware of the interest.
D. A Gift Tax Should Not Be Imposed Upon a Disclaimer Until the
Interest Becomes A Possessory Interest
Under property law, a disclaimer is the refusal to accept a gift or
devise.146 A disclaimer is an act of non-acceptance.147 The disclaimant’s
creditor could not reach the assets since they did not belong to the disclaimant.148 The disclaimed property passed as if the disclaimant predeceased the decedent.149 The disclaimant does not direct to whom the
property passes; rather the disclaimant simply does not accept the inheritance.150 The disclaimant is therefore not deemed to have transferred
the assets, either directly or indirectly, for transfer tax purposes.151 A
non-general power of appointment, more commonly referred to as a
“limited power of appointment,” has similar parallels.152 A limited
power of appointment is not subject to estate taxes even if the power
143

See Schain, supra note 142 and accompanying quotation.
Roehner & Roehner, supra note 132 at 293-94, asserts the following:
But even if a man renounces because he wants to aid the natural objects of his
bounty, can the Government tell him that he must pay an excise tax for refusing
to accept property, because if he had accepted it the Government would have
extracted a gift tax from him when he made a gift. . . .
We believe that the right to reject is an inalienable right which cannot be taxed
by the Government consistently with the Fifth Amendment, and that as an English judge said in Thompson v. Leach “a man cannot have an estate put into
him in spight of his teeth.”
Id.; see also Wolfson, supra note 83 § 43.03[3], at 43-9 (“The imposition of the ‘transfer
date test,’ without reference to knowledge, is clearly oppressive.”).
145 Wolfson, supra note 83 § 43.03[3], at 43-9.
146 See supra Part I.A.
147 Ellsworth, supra note 8, at 695 (“A disclaimer is fundamentally different from a
voluntary transfer of property because it is a refusal to accept property ab initio.”).
148 LaPiana, supra note 1, at 232.
149 Id. at 214.
150 Id.
151 I.R.C. § 2518(a).
152 A position asserted by the taxpayer in Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 317-18
(1982). The Supreme Court however concluded that a disclaimer “more closely resembles
a general power of appointment,” Id. at 318.
144
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holder can appoint to anyone in the world, other than to herself, her
creditors or the creditors of her estate.153 A disclaimer is an act of less
control than the exercise of a limited power of appointment. It is similar
to that of a non-exercise of a limited power of appointment.
In Jewett, the Treasury argued that a disclaimer is similar to a general power of appointment.154 An individual holding a general power of
appointment can appoint the property to herself, her creditors or the
creditors of her estate.155 The Treasury asserted a disclaimer is similar to
one that holds the right to appoint the property to oneself.156 The Treasury is correct in that the individual can choose to accept the interest
and thus enrich herself.157 Several commentators have argued that a
disclaimer should be fully subject to gift taxes since it is an act of control
similar to the control of one holding a general power of appointment.158
153

See I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1).
Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318.
155 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1).
156 Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318.
157 See Martin, supra note 7, at 357, in which the author asserts “the treatment of
general powers of appointment offers a most persuasive analogy for justifying taxation of
disclaimers” and continues in the following pages of his article to recommend that all
disclaimers be subject to gift tax.
158 Id.; Additionally, in Note, Disclaimers, supra note 32, at 1047-48, the author
notes:
There is some theoretical justification for treating every disclaimer as either a
taxable gift by the disclaimant or a transfer of property the value of which may
be includible in the disclaimant’s gross estate. Inherent in his choice of accepting
or rejecting tendered property is at least some degree of control over the subject
matter, whether or not he exercises that right in a manner which prevents the
vesting of technical “title” in him. Furthermore, the result of a disclaimer . . . is
that the property disclaimed goes to the same persons, and in the same way, that
the disclaimant would wish it to go if it were his own property. For example, a
son may disclaim interests in his father’s estate, knowing that under his father’s
will they will pass to the grandchildren and hoping thus to avoid the imposition
of a gift tax or a second estate tax.
On the other hand, it seems unfair to predicate tax liability on control which the
donee may have gotten without any volition of his own, where that control is
limited to a choice of accepting the gift with its concomitant tax consequences or
allowing it to follow a single alternative route provided by the donor. It seems
particularly odd, in the context of the gift tax, that a donee by acting solely in
order to defeat an attempted gift made to him can make himself liable to a tax
as on a gift made by him.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Note, Taxation, supra note 19, at 909-910, wherein the
author notes:
However, there are several justifications for treating a disclaimer as a taxable
event. In most cases, the recipient of the interest in event of disclaimer can be
easily determined, and the disclaimant knows to whom the interest will pass.
Practically speaking, the recipient upon disclaimer usually will be an heir of the
disclaimant, and a disclaimant who does not need the property for his personal
154
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This argument has some merit. Arguably, it would be logically consistent for the Treasury to tax all disclaimers.159 However, such an argument imposes a gift tax on non-acceptance and is inconsistent with a
long-established property law doctrine.160
While an individual cannot control to whom the property passes if
he or she wishes to disclaim, it is argued an individual disclaims only if
the property passes to whom he or she wishes. In Jewett, the Treasury
argued that the taxpayer controls to whom the property passes by deciding whether to disclaim or not.161 The assertion may be correct since
individuals often disclaim because they want to benefit the individuals
to whom the property passes as a result of the disclaimer.162 If the property will pass to someone that the disclaimant does not wish to benefit,
the individual may elect not to disclaim. Of course, this is not always the
case. An individual may wish to disclaim to avoid creditors even though
the property may pass to individuals who are not the individual’s preferred choice. But, in many cases the individual executes a disclaimer
because the alternate takers are objects of the individual’s bounty.
Again, however, this position is making non-acceptance an act of control.163 In a disclaimer, it is the grantor or decedent who has determined
to whom the property passes, not the disclaimant. The disclaimant cannot control to whom the property passes. The “control” in a disclaimer
is similar to the “control” in the non-exercise of a limited power of
appointment.164
sustenance can readily appreciate the tax advantages of disclaiming. Thus, the
motive behind disclaimers is very likely to be tax avoidance, as a person is able
to pass more property by disclaiming than by accepting and subsequently passing the property inter vivos or through his estate.
159 See Martin, supra note 7, at 357; see also Note, Disclaimers in Federal Taxation,
supra note 32, at 1047-48.
160 Ellsworth, supra note 8, at 756.). Cf. quotation cited supra note 158, provides:
Imposing a transfer tax on all disclaimers would be unfair and unwise. It would
interfere with long-established property law doctrine by creating a corresponding but diametrically opposed tax law doctrine. While tax law can be, and sometimes is divorced from property law, this has never been favored in our country.
The common-law rule of disclaimers has a long and venerable history; disclaimers do serve important and legitimate purposes. To permit the I.R.C. to hobble
this ancient rule of law would be imprudent and unnecessary.
161 See Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318.
162 See supra note 158; see also Note, Taxation, supra note 19, at 910.
163 In Roehner & Roehner, supra note 132, at 293, the authors state:
But even if a man renounces because he wants to aid the natural objects of his
bounty, can the Government tell him that he must pay an excise tax for refusing
to accept property, because if he had accepted it the Government would have
extracted a gift tax from him when he made a gift?
164 The following comment in Note, Taxation supra note 19, at 908-09 asserts:
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Since issuance of regulations in 1958, the Treasury has taken the
position that a disclaimer executed within a reasonable period of time is
not a transfer giving rise to gift tax.165 The common law provides that
acceptance bars a disclaimer.166 Under the common law, if a person has
not executed a disclaimer within a reasonable period of time, the person
is deemed to have accepted the gift.167 Thus, an unreasonable delay in
acceptance constitutes an acceptance.168
As for present interests, for example an outright devise of $100,000,
IRC § 2518 requires that that the disclaimer be executed within nine
months of the decedent’s death to be a “qualified disclaimer.” In some
cases this time period may work an injustice. For example, if there is a
will contest and it is unclear to whom the estate passes, the time period
may run on a disclaimer before it is clear to whom the estate passes.
Arguably, if you don’t want anything it should not matter to whom the
estate passes. The fact that someone is concerned to whom the estate
passes for property they wish to disclaim supports the “control” argument. However, a person wishing to make a partial disclaimer is precluded from effectively disclaiming in many instances if a will contest
occurs. The National Commissioners on Uniform Laws in UDPIA
(1999) have eliminated the time requirement altogether allowing acceptance to be the only bar to disclaiming.169 An argument could be made
that the time period should be eliminated altogether.
The Legislative History indicates the disclaimer provisions were enacted to provide uniform treatment for disclaimers.170 Commentators
and organizations were seeking uniformity of tax treatment when local
law didn’t provide uniformity in the definition of “reasonable time,”
whether partial disclaimers could be executed, and whether one could
The traditional argument for allowing tax-insulated disclaimers is that a person
should not be forced to accept property with the concomitant burdens and responsibilities inherent in ownership. Therefore, he should have the right of rejection without being subject to a gift tax liability. Since any tax on a disclaimer
would have to be predicated on control over the property rather than enjoyment or possession, it is arguably unfair to predicate tax liability on control
limited to the choice of accepting an interest or allowing it to pass to those
entitled to take as a result of the disclaimer.
165 See Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 61 (8th Cir. 1973), overruled by Jewett v.
Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); see also Cottrell v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.
1980).
166 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 1, §49.1 at 38.
167 See supra Part I.A.
168 See supra Part I.A.
169 See supra Part III.E.3.
170 H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, ESTATE AND GIFT REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1380, at 66-67 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) 3356, 342021. See supra Part II for a detailed analysis of the Committee Hearings and Reports.
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disclaim intestate property.171 Within the exception of two states, all of
the states provided that a person could disclaim within a reasonable period of time after becoming entitled to current possession or interest of
trust property.172 Uniformity already existed as to when the time period
began to run in a future interest.173 Lack of uniformity only existed as
to how long a period of time an individual could disclaim, not when the
time period began to run with respect to a future interest.174 In TRA
‘76, Congress enacted legislation which required a disclaimer of a future
interest to be executed within nine months of creation.175 This new requirement adopted a new time period in which to disclaim which didn’t
exist in any state, thereby abolishing the common and statutory law. It
was made without a single explanation.176 At least one commentator
asserts Congress simply did not know what it was doing.177
Why do the common law and the statutes in nearly every state set
the beginning time period in which to disclaim a future interest from the
time the interest becomes indefeasibly vested or set no time period at all
on when a disclaimer must be executed? The Treasury in its brief to the
Supreme Court argued,
To qualify as a nontaxable transfer for federal gift tax purposes, a disclaimer must also satisfy a federal timeliness requirement. The reasonable time requirement of the Regulation
is separate and distinct from the timeliness standard under
state law.
171 Blazek & O’Donoghue, supra note 27, § 7.02[2], at 7-6; Note, supra note 19, at
921 (“Disclaimers should be taxed in some uniform manner.”). See also Doris D. Blazek,
Use of Disclaimers in Post-Mortem Planning, in N.Y.U. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH
INST. ON FEDERAL TAXATION § 7.02[2], at 7-6 (Nicolas Liakas ed. 1982).
172 In Wolfson, supra note 83 § 43.03[3], at 43-9 to 43-10, wherein the author states:

Congress failed to observe that the Uniform Disclaimer Laws drafted by the
Commissioners on Uniform Law as well as all but two state statutes agreed on
one point: they all measure the time limitation in the case of future interests
from the date the interest becomes indefeasibly vested, not from the date of the
transfer creating the interest. Nevertheless, Congress proceeded to draft the
federal tax law provision based upon a “transfer date” test. This seems to be a
strange way to create uniformity. What Congress has done is make the Uniform
Disclaimer Laws and the laws of the vast majority of the states uniformly
wrong. Congress did not say that it did not like the Uniform Law approach, it
simply referred to it and then did the opposite.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009, 90 Stat. 1893 (codified as
amended in I.R.C. § 2518(b)).
176 Wolfson, supra note 83, § 43.03[3], at 43-8.
177 Id.
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This difference between state and federal timeliness requirements arises as a consequence of the different concerns of state
property law and the federal gift tax law. The federal gift tax is
concerned with control over the disposition of property and
with the exercise of a right to determine those who will possess, enjoy or own property or property rights. State law is primarily concerned with balancing conflicting claims to property,
and protecting the rights of creditors and other third parties.
To accomplish these purposes, state law may allow considerable time to pass after a person learns of a property interest
before he must disclaim. On the other hand, the passage of
time is crucial under the scheme of the federal gift tax, because
time allows a potential recipient to engage in planning his estate by exercising control over the future interest and to wait to
see whether he himself needs the property, or whether he
should choose to have it pass to the next generation. Thus,
even though petitioner’s disclaimers were timely under state
law, the passage of 33 years after the creation of his interest by
means of the transfer in trust, and 24 years after attaining his
majority, far exceeded a reasonable time for petitioner to wait
before disclaiming his interest under Section 25.2511-1(c). The
disclaimers were thus indirect transfers subject to the gift tax
under Sections 2501 and 2511.178
The Treasury’s argument is disingenuous. State law is concerned with
who will possess, enjoy and own property and property rights. These
concerns are just as important, and maybe more so, than protecting the
rights of creditors and third parties. If the latter were the primary concern, then arguably, it would seem advisable for the states to require an
individual to disclaim within a shorter period of time than possibly even
the federal statute. With one or two exceptions, states permit an individual to disclaim within a reasonable time of becoming indefeasibly vested
or at any time before acceptance, because there is no compelling reason
to require someone to accept a gift before they are present with possession.179 Only at that time is it important for the individual to make a
178 Brief for the Respondent at 7-8, Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982) (No. 801614), 1981 WL 390092.
179 In Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimer Law and UPDIA’s Unintended Consequences, 36
EST. PLN. 34, 36 (2009), the author states:
As a matter of public policy, no justification for setting a deadline on disclaimers
is apparent. Obviously, once beneficiaries have accepted an inheritance, they
should forfeit the right to disclaim; otherwise they might retain the opportunity
to render themselves judgment proof retroactively. But so long as acceptance
stands as an independent bar to disclaiming, which it universally does, no one is
harmed by allowing beneficiaries to draw out their decision, which might prove
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determination as to whether to accept or reject an inheritance. Arguably, the federal government does have a reason to require a disclaimer
to be made within the estate tax filing period for outright gifts and certain transfers into trusts so that the executor can determine the amount
of the estate tax and pay the tax. The same rationale does not apply to
the disclaimer of a future interest.
In its brief, the Treasury also does not indicate how the passage of
time “allows a potential recipient to engage in planning his estate by
exercising control over the future interest.”180 The Treasury argues,
the Regulations imposes a federal timeliness requirement that
subjects to the gift tax those persons who maintain control over
the disposition of property by postponing their decision to disclaim. It is precisely that type of estate planning by inter vivos
transfer at which the gift tax is aimed. By requiring that disclaimers be made within a reasonable period after a person
learns of his right to a property interest, the Regulations implements “the evident desire of Congress [in enacting the gift tax]
to hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can
devise that are not business transactions within the meaning of
ordinary speech.”181
The Treasury continues:
If a person is to be permitted to refuse to accept an interest in
property and have that interest pass to a successor without gift
tax consequences, it is entirely appropriate that he should also
be required to manifest that refusal promptly upon learning of
his right to that property interest. Indeed, if the rule were otherwise, a person could consider at length whether a disclaimer
would be the most advantageous course of action, i.e., whether
he would prefer to receive the assets himself or allow them to
pass to his successor in interest. In appraising his options, he
could belatedly measure the resources available in his own estate in order to ascertain whether he should take the property
interest for his own personal needs. Thus, absent a timeliness
requirement, the holder of the property interest could, perhaps
up to the moment of his own death- if state law posed no bar-

advantageous if probate is contested or delayed, or if contingencies remain to be
resolved.
180 Brief for the Respondent at 8, Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982) (No. 801614), 1981 WL 390092, at *6.
181 Id. at 16 (citing Comm’r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945)).
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rier- engage in the very type of estate planning by inter vivos
transfers upon which the gift tax is imposed.182
The Treasury asserts that mere delay is an act of control.183 By refusing to accept or reject the gift the recipient is involved in estate planning and thereby controlling to whom the property passes.184 The
Treasury is partially correct. If the individual were permitted to make a
qualified disclaimer after the recipient was presented with possession,
the recipient would at that time determine, based on the circumstances
then existing, whether to accept or reject the gift. But, it is only at that
time will the recipient be in a position to know the nature and the
amount of the property at issue. At any time before possession, the interest is a future contingency. It is only at the time possession is
presented can the recipient make an informed decision. At any time
before such time the nature and the value of the interest in unknown.
For example, assume a mother possess the legal life estate in her home
with the title passing at her death to her then-living issue. Her issue do
not know whether they will ever possess title since they may predecease
their mother. In addition, they don’t know the value they are disclaiming until their mother dies. The home could substantially increase or
decrease in value, and in rare cases could become exceedingly valuable.
The Treasury takes the position that it is unfair to allow a person to
disclaim a future interest many years after the interest is created. It argues that the person has enjoyed the benefits of the future interest.185 In
Jewett, the Treasury argued that it would be unfair to allow a person
who has had the control associated with a future interest to be able to
disclaim years after the interest’s creation.186 The Treasury does not explain what control a contingent interest has over the trust. It is hard to
understand how the mere possession of a future interest is an act of
control, especially if the person holding the contingent interest was not
182

Id. at 17.
Id. at 16. (“The validity of petitioner’s disclaimers under state law is insufficient to
bar the imposition of the gift tax because his 33-year delay in making the disclaimers
enabled him to control the disposition of his interest in the trust.”).
184 See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 117 (“American courts almost universally have extended the right of disclaimer to cases in which the disclaiming party was motivated by
tax considerations- with scarcely a word about public policy- on the theory that tax statutes have failed to preclude this legal stratagem.”).
185 See Note, supra note 19, at 917 n.61 (“Traditionally, the only benefits which are
considered such for the purposes of determining whether acceptance has taken place are
actual benefits, as distinguished from the benefit one derives from knowing, and thereby
being able to plan accordingly, that he will receive an interest at some time in the
future.”).
186 See supra text accompanying note 182.
183
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aware of the existence of the interest, or was aware but never participated in any way in the trust administration.
The states and the UDPIA permit an individual to disclaim upon
being presented with possession because it is at that time the individual
can fully appreciate the property to be received, understand the value of
the property and its nature, and evaluate his or her need for the property.187 Commentators have noted that it is harsh to run the disclaimer
period on the appointee of a broad limited power of appointment since
it is possible that the individual was unaware of the existence of the
trust.188 Others have said it is harsh to require an individual to disclaim
property he or she may never own.189 Some argue that it is unreasonable to require a disclaimer before an individual is aware of the quality
and quantity of the amount they are disclaiming.190 One commentator
187

See quotation cited supra note 179.
In Frimmer, supra note 198, at 267-68, the author notes:
The Proposed Regulations [which later became final –see supra footnote 86 in
which the Final Regulations are reproduced] also make it clear that in the case
of a limited power of appointment, the holder of the power, permissible appointees, or takers in default of appointment must disclaim within nine months after
the creation of the power. With respect to limited powers where the permissible
appointees are ascertainable, this rule does not seem unreasonable. However, if
the class of permissible appointees is so broad as to render it impossible to determine whether a potential individual will become an appointee, the rule is
extremely harsh.
189 See Schain, supra note 142, at 29; Medlin, supra note 137, at 1286; Jewett v
Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 325 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[A] remainderman [has]
really nothing to accept or renounce by way of beneficial ownership or control of the
property until he succeed[s] in outliving the life beneficiary.” (quoting Keinath v.
Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 64 (8th Cir. 1973)).
190 “There is nothing unfair or improper in allowing the remainderman to wait until
the life beneficiary’s death and then decide whether to accept the bequest.” Jewett, 455
U.S. at 325 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188

The Commissioner stresses repeatedly the number of years that elapsed between the
death of the testatrix and the execution of the disclaimer. . . . But to require the disclaimer long before the interest could ripen into enjoyment means that the decision must
be made at a time when the disclaimant does not know what he is disclaiming or whether
he ever would receive and enjoy any interest.
Id. at 328; see also Martin, supra note 7, at 333 n.69 (“It is unreasonable to expect a
refusal to be articulated if the intended recipient is unaware that he has been offered
something. Moreover, a meaningful decision can be made only when the exact nature and
extent of the gift are known.”); Wolfson, supra note 83 § 43.03[4], at 43-11 (“[Asking]
what policy consideration justifies the requirement that immediate affirmative written
action be taken with respect to property which is not then or may never be the property
of the disclaimant, the value of which interest can only be determined by vague actuarial
speculations[.]”); Note, supra note 32, at 1050 (“If the gift is of a future interest, it might
from the standpoint of property law be unreasonable to expect the donee to manifest his
acceptance or rejection prior to the time the interest vests in possession, but this should
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has noted that the current law is discriminatory because only the currently wealthy can entertain executing a disclaimer of a future interest,
while the poor and middle class cannot afford to anticipate that they
may need the future interest.191 As stated by one commentator, “[a]
strong equitable argument can certainly be made for the proposition
that the period should not run until the interest becomes indefeasibly
vested.”192
E. Obligatory Devises
The 9-month from creation requirement of existing disclaimer tax
law works an injustice with respect to gifts that obligate the devisee to
transfer funds to another as a condition of receiving the gift. The inequities are displayed in Estate of Balson,193 wherein the decedent died in
1978 survived by his wife and four children. His will devised a life estate
in the decedent’s homestead to his wife with the remainder to his son,
on the condition that on the wife’s demise that his son pay two of decedent’s daughters (the son’s siblings) a sum of $50,000 each. Decedent’s
wife died in 1992, fourteen years after decedent’s death. At that time,
not necessarily determine the tax issue.”); However, a contrary position is taken in Note,
supra note 19, at 917-918:
In the property law context, there seems little necessity for forcing the beneficiary of a future interest to make a choice of accepting or rejecting such interest
until he becomes entitled to possession. Thus, it is arguable that, under state
law, the mere lapse of time would not be considered acceptance of a future
interest. If this is the case, the policy underlying state property concepts, in this
context, would be inconsistent with the motive behind the federal gift tax statute. The gift tax is aimed at taxing inter vivos gifts which allow the donor to
avoid the imposition of an estate tax on property he has had the beneficial enjoyment of during his lifetime. When a gift is made, the donor’s estate avoids the
imposition of an estate tax on such property on the theory that the gift was
complete at its creation. To disclaim after an extended period of time on the
theory that the gift is not yet complete would seem to be inconsistent with the
theory under which the interest escaped imposition of an estate tax. It would
also seem to subvert the basic policy behind these taxing statutes, particularly
when the disclaimant, during this time, had the economic security of the right to
receive the interest. Thus, in contrast with local law, it appears that federal
criteria are likely to provide a more stringent limitation upon the ability of a
beneficiary to effectively disclaim a future interest.
191 See Wolfson, supra note 83 § 43.03[4], at 43-11; In Martin, supra note 7, at 362,
the author argues that all disclaimers should be subject to transfer tax on the theory that:
Persons with modest means cannot afford even to entertain the idea [of a disclaimer]. They accept, possess, and use their property, and they suffer the consequences of transfer taxation when the residue passes to the next family member.
Disclaimers, then, present opportunities to keep wealth intact. In this respect,
they work contrary to the basic purpose of wealth taxation.
192 Wolfson, supra note 83 § 43.03[4], at 43-10.
193 In re Estate of Balson, 515 N.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
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the homestead was appraised for less than $100,000. The son executed a
disclaimer. The daughters argued that the disclaimer was not valid and
therefore their brother owed each of them $50,000. The applicable state
statute provided, “[a]n instrument disclaiming a future interest shall be
executed and delivered not later than 9 months after the event that determines that the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained
and his or her interest indefeasibly fixed[.]”194 The state court held the
disclaimer was valid. The disclaimer would not constitute a qualified disclaimer under IRC § 2518 however unless the son was less than 21 years
and 9 months of age upon his mother’s demise. The son’s disclaimer
would give rise to a gift. Under the facts of Balson, however, the value
of the gift would be zero since the obligated payments exceeded the
value of the residence. Problems will exist if the property at issue is
difficult to value.
F. The GST Tax Impact of Disclaiming Future Interest
The General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, prepared
by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, contains the following
comment in reference to the generation-skipping transfer tax:
Disclaimers. – A beneficiary under a generation-skipping trust
is permitted to disclaim his interest in that trust within the
same time period and in the same manner as would any beneficiary of an outright gift or bequest. . . . The Congress also
wished to clarify that for purposes of the new disclaimer rules
(sec. 2518), the event which triggers the 9-month period allowed for an effective disclaimer is the generation-skipping
transfer (either a taxable termination or a taxable
distribution).195
This comment finds no support in the statutory language and was not
followed in the Regulations.196 Under the Treasury Regulations, the
time period in which to disclaim runs from the time of the gift for property later included in the transferor’s federal gross estate, not from the
time of later estate tax inclusion.197 Likewise, a future interest in a qualified terminable interest property (“QTIP”) trust must be disclaimed
within nine months of initial creation.198 Later, estate tax inclusion of
the QTIP trust in the surviving spouse’s estate does not begin a new
194

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.40(4)(b) (West 1991) (repealed 1992).
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-10612, AT 580-81 (Comm.
Print 1976).
196 See Frimmer, supra note 98, at 268.
197 See Treas. Reg. §25.2518-2(c)(3).
198 See id.
195
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time period.199 If a beneficiary has a general power of appointment, the
individuals who receive the interest in the trust due to an exercise or
lapse of the power have until 9 months after the exercise of lapse to
disclaim.200 Individuals who receive an interest as a result of the exercise
of a lapse of a limited power of appointment must disclaim within 9
months of the creation of the interest.201 Arguably, these four examples
are inconsistent. In the first two cases later estate tax inclusion does not
result in a new disclaimer period even though estate tax inclusion results.202 However, in the case of a general power of appointment, later
estate tax inclusion does result in the beginning of a new disclaimer period. The individual to whom property passes as a result of the nonexercise of a general power of appointment is in a similar position as the
individual to whom property passes as a result of the non-exercise of a
limited power of appointment. In both cases, the default taker in the
event of non-exercise of the power has a contingent interest created by
the original grantor. It would seem immaterial that the property is subject to later estate tax inclusion in the estate of the holder of the general
power of appointment. The distinction between a limited power and
general power is drawn on the limited universe of appointees in a limited power of appointment. Of course, if the power holder can appoint
to anyone other than herself, her creditor and the creditors of her estate,
the distinction seems quite artificial. To argue that due respect must be
given to the property law concept that the exercise of a limited power is
deemed the action of the grantor rather than the power holder, which is
not the case with a general power of appointment, seems inconsistent
with the position that due deference is not given to the common law
which permitted a disclaimer within a reasonable time of vesting of a
future interest. On this framework, we need to examine a taxable
termination.
In a taxable termination, a portion, or all, of the trust is subject to
generation-skipping transfer (hereinafter “GST”) tax. Since a taxable
termination does not alter to whom the property passes, it appears more
consistent with the Treasury’s tax treatment of QTIP property to consider that a new time period should not begin to run. The grantor determined to whom the trust assets would eventually pass, similar to the
grantor of a QTIP, and transfer tax inclusion does not alter that result.
This approach leads to internal consistency in the Regulations but is in199

See id.
Id; see also id. § 25.2518-2(c)(5) ex. 2.
201 Id. § 25.2518-2(c)(3).
202 See BRAND & LAPIANA, supra note 1, at 64 (noting that the disclaimer period
must run from the time of the completed transfer for gift tax purposes in the case of later
estate tax inclusion in the grantor’s estate, since it is possible that the grantor may relinquish the retained power during the grantor’s lifetime).
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consistent with the Joint Committee comments noted supra. The author’s recommendation that Congress amend the Code to permit the
disclaimer time period to run from the time that the future interest becomes indefeasibly vested would permit disclaimers when a taxable termination occurs in some, but not all instances.203
One commentator has asserted that the enactment of the GST tax
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has made it possible to repeal Section
2518 and return to a state-dominated system of disclaimer law.204 The
commentator fails to explain why the passage of the GST tax in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 would permit repeal of § 2518 when a GST tax was
also enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 that gave us § 2518. In fact
Example 3 of Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(5) provided the
following:
F [established a generation skipping] trust [(section 2611(b))]
on April 1, 1978, in which F’s child G is to receive the income
from the trust for life. Upon G’s death, the corpus of the trust
is to pass to G’s child H[, who was 22 years of age on April 1,
1978]. If either G or H wishes to make a qualified disclaimer, it
must be made not later than 9 months after April 1, 1978.205
The replacement of the old GST tax with a new GST tax doesn’t
seem to justify different treatment of the disclaimer period.
V. SOME PRACTICAL IMPACTS

OF

PROPOSAL

Under the federal tax provisions under pre-TRA ‘76 law, the disclaimer period began to run from the time that an individual gained
knowledge of the existence of the transfer. Presumably, factual disputes
arose as to when the individual became aware of the existence of the
transfer. Current IRC § 2518 avoids factual disputes. The disclaimer period runs from the later of the creation of the interest or the individual
turning age 21.206 Factual disputes over when the individual became
203 In some instances a skip person may be entitled to income and principal distributions from a trust during the non-skip beneficiary’s lifetime. Thus, the skip person may be
precluded from disclaiming the remainder interest.
204 Ellsworth, supra note 8, at 697.
205 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(5), ex. (3). Example 3 of Final Treas. Reg.
§25.2518-2(c)(5) has been modified as follows: (1) the introductory phrase “F established
a generation-skipping trust (section 2611(b)) on April 1, 1978” has been replaced with “F
creates a trust on April 1, 1978;” and (2) the phrase “who was 22 years of age on April 1,
1978” has been removed. No explanation is given for these changes. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 which repealed the GST tax laws enacted in 1976 and replaced it with a new GST
tax was not enacted until October 22, 1986, several months after the issuance of the final
regulation on August 7, 1986.
206 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
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aware of the interest are avoided, saving the taxpayer, the Treasury and
the courts time and money. Unfortunately, this savings comes at the expense of those individuals who are unable to disclaim because the time
period to disclaim has expired before they become aware of the existence of the trust. Justice tilts in favor of protecting the rights of the
uninformed. Admittedly, this justice will come with the associated expense of determining when the individual became aware of the existence of the interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unless there is a legitimate governmental purpose, the law should
not penalize an individual by imposing a gift tax on exercising a fundamental property right, provided the disclaimer is executed before the
property is accepted. If the time to disclaim has run before an individual is aware of the property transfer, practically speaking he or she is
precluded from disclaiming because of gift tax ramifications. It is unreasonable to impose a gift tax on an individual when the individual refuse
a gift or devise if he or she has not unreasonably delayed his or her
refusal. Congress should amend IRC § 2518 to permit an individual to
disclaim within a reasonable period of time after the later to occur of (1)
becoming aware of the interest or (2) the interest becoming indefeasibly
fixed.

